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Abstract
Mathematics shows much more durability in its attention to concepts and theories than do other sciences:
for example, Galen may not be of much use to modern medicine, but one can still read and use Euclid. One
might expect that this situation would make mathematicians sympathetic to history, but quite the opposite is the
case. Their normal attention to history is concerned with heritage: that is, how did we get here? Old results are
modernized in order to show their current place; but the historical context is ignored and thereby often distorted.
By contrast, the historian is concerned with what happened in the past, whatever be the modern situation. Each
approach is perfectly legitimate, but they are often confused. The difference between them is discussed, with
examples exhibited; these will include Euclid, set theory, limits, and applied mathematics in general.
 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Sumário
Nota-se na Matemática uma muito maior durabilidade em relação a conceitos e teorias do que nas outras
ciências: por exemplo, Galeno não será muito útil para a Medicina moderna, mas Euclides ainda pode ser lido
e utilizado. Poder-se-ia esperar que esta situação levasse os matemáticos a simpatizarem com a história, mas
acontece precisamente o oposto. Normalmente a sua perspectiva da história é de herança; isto é, “como chegamos
aqui?”. Os resultados antigos são modernizados para que se possa ver o seu lugar actual, mas o contexto histórico
é ignorado e portanto frequentemente distorcido. Por contraste, o historia dor preocupa-se com o que aconteceu
no passado independentemente da situação moderna. Ambas as abordagens são perfeitamente válidas, mas são
frequentemente confundidas. A diferença entre elas é discutida, e apresentam-se exemplos: estes incluem Euclides,
teoria de conjuntos, limites e Matemática Aplicada em geral.
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regard as irrelevant anything a scientist today might think about any aspects of science, including his own debt to the past or reaction
against it. —C.A. Truesdell III, Essays in the History of Mechanics (Foreword) [1968]
You think that the world is what it looks like in fine weather at noonday; I think that it seems like in the early morning when one first
wakes from deep sleep. —A.N. Whitehead to B. Russell in B. Russell, Portraits from Memory and Other Essays (p. 41) [1956]
As all historians know, the past is a great darkness, and filled with echoes. Voices may reach us from it; but [. . .] try as we may, we
cannot always decipher them in the clearer light of our own day. —Margaret Atwood, end of The Handmaid’s Tale [1985]
1. The pasts and the futures
1.1. The basic distinction
The growth of interest and work in the history of mathematics during the past three decades or so has
led to reactions among mathematicians. Some of them have been welcoming, and indeed have contributed
their own historical research; but many others have been cautious, even contemptuous, about the work
produced by practicing historians, especially on account of the historians’ apparently limited knowledge
of mathematics.1 By the latter they usually mean some modern version of the mathematics in question,
and the failure of historians to take due note of it.
There is a deep and general distinction involved here, locatable in any branch of mathematics, any
period, any culture, and possibly involving teaching or popularization of mathematics as well as its
research. It seems to be sensed by people working in history, whether they come to the subject with
mainly a historical or a mathematical motivation. However, it has not been much discussed in the
literature; even the survey [May, 1976] of historiography jumps across it.
I use the words “history” and “heritage” to name two interpretations of a mathematical theory; the
corresponding actors are “historians” and “inheritors” (or “heirs”), respectively. The word “notion” serves
as the umbrella term to cover a theory (or definition, proof-method, technique, algorithm, notation(s),
whole branch of mathematics, . . .), and the letter “N” to symbolize it. A sequence of notions in recognized
order in the development of a mathematical theory is notated ‘N0, N1, N2, . . . .’
By “history” I refer to the details of the development of N: its prehistory and concurrent developments;
the chronology of progress, as far as it can be determined; and maybe also the impact in the immediately
following years and decades. History addresses the question “what happened in the past?” and gives
descriptions; maybe it also attempts explanations of some kinds, in order to answer the corresponding
“why?” question (Section 3.10). History should also address the dual questions “what did not happen
in the past?” and “why not?”; false starts, missed opportunities [Dyson, 1972], sleepers, and repeats are
noted and maybe explained. The (near-)absence of later notions from N is registered, as well as their
eventual arrival; differences between N and seemingly similar more modern notions are likely to be
emphasized.
1 Another point of division between the two disciplines is techniques and practices specific to historical work, such as the
finding, examination, and deployment of manuscript sources and of large-scale bibliographies. The latter are rehearsed, for the
pre-computer age, in May [1973, 3–41]. They are not directly relevant to this paper.
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the forms which it may take, or be embodied, in later contexts.2 Some modern form of N is usually the
main focus, with attention paid to the course of its development. Here the mathematical relationships
will be noted, but historical ones in the above sense will hold much less interest. Heritage addresses the
question “how did we get here?,” and often the answer reads like “the royal road to me.” The modern
notions are inserted into N when appropriate, and thereby N is unveiled (a nice word proposed to me by
Henk Bos): similarities between N and its more modern notions are likely to be emphasized; the present
is photocopied onto the past.
Both kinds of activity are quite legitimate, and indeed important in their own right; in particular,
mathematical research often seems to be conducted in a heritage-like way (Section 3.1), whether the
predecessors produced their work long ago or very recently. The confusion of the two kinds of activity is
not legitimate, either taking heritage to be history (frequently the mathematicians’ view—and historians’
sometimes!) or taking history to be heritage (the occasional burst of excess enthusiasm by a historian);
indeed, such conflations may well mess up both categories, especially the historical record. In the case
of sequences of notions, a pernicious case arises when N1 is a logical consequence or a generalization
of N0, and the claim is made that a knower of N0 knew N1 also [May, 1975a]; an example is given in
Section 3.5.
A philosophical difference is that inheritors tend to focus upon knowledge alone (theorems as such,
and so on), while historians also seek motivations, causes, and understanding in a more general sense.
The distinction sometimes made by historians of science between “internal” and “external” history forms
part of this difference. Each category is explicitly metatheoretical, though history may demand the greater
finesse in the handling of different levels of theory.
A third category of writing is when a theory is laid out completely time-free with all developments
omitted, historical or otherwise; for example, as a strictly axiomatized theory. This kind of writing is
also quite legitimate; it tells us that “we are here.” A similar fourth category is large-scale bibliographies,
including classifications and indexing by topic. These categories are neither history nor heritage, although
they may well involve both.3 Apart from noting that they too will be influenced by history though
probably without the knowledge of the practitioners (Section 5.4), I shall not consider them further here.
1.2. Some literature
Two prominent types of writing in which heritage is the main guide are review articles and lengthy
reports. Names, dates, and references are given frequently, and chronology (of publication) may well be
checked quite scrupulously; but motivations, cultural background, processes of genesis, and historical
complications are usually left out. A golden period in report writing was at the turn of the 19th and 20th
centuries, especially in German, with two main locations: the reports, often lengthy, in the early volumes
of the Jahresberichte of the Deutsche Mathematiker-Vereinigung (1892–); and the articles composing the
2 In my first lectures on this topic I used the word “genealogy” to name this concept. I now prefer “heritage,” partly on
semantic grounds and partly for its attractive similarity to “history” in English as another three-syllable word in English
beginning with “h.”
3 A current project to classify the primary literature as reviewed in the Jahrbuch ueber die Fortschritte der Mathematik
(1867–1942) imposes a modern division into topics and subtopics. My efforts to handle the early articles on mechanics were
quite unsatisfying: heritage dominated a task intrinsically historical, at least for the early decades of that period.
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French Encyclopédie des sciences mathématiques (1904–1916?) [Gispert, 1999]. Some of these texts are
quite historical.4
Among modern examples of heritage-oriented historical writings, Jean Dieudonné’s lengthy account
of algebraic and differential topology in the 20th century is (impressively) typical [Dieudonné, 1989],
and several of the essays in the Bourbaki history have the same character [Bourbaki, 1974]. André Weil’s
widely read advice [1980] on how to do history is largely driven by needs of heritage and even dismissive
of history, especially concerning the relative importance of judgements of the mathematics of the past
(Section 2). An interesting slip is his use of “history of mathematics” and “mathematical history” as
synonyms, whereas the expressions denote quite different subjects [Grattan-Guinness, 1997, 759–761].
2. An example
The distinction between history and heritage has been cast above in as general a manner as possible;
any piece of mathematics from any culture will be susceptible to it. Here is an example, mathematically
simple but historically very important (a contrast which itself manifests the distinction).
Book 2, Proposition 4 of Euclid’s Elements comprises this theorem about “completing the square”:
From the late 19th century onwards an influential historical interpretation developed, in which Euclid
was taken to be a “geometric algebraist,” handling geometrical notions and configurations but actually
practicing common algebra. (Compare the remarks in Section 1.2 on history and heritage at that time.)
Under this interpretation the diagram is rendered as
(1)(a + b)2 = a2 + 2ab + b2.
However, historical disquiet should rise.
First, (1) is a piece of algebra, which Euclid did not use, even covertly: his diagram does not carry
the letters a and b.5 His theorem concerned geometry, about the large square being composed of four
parts, with rectangles to the right and above the smaller square and a little square off in the north-east
corner; indeed, he specifically defined as “the gnomon,” the L-shape formed by the three small regions
4 See Dauben [1999] on the journals for the history of mathematics at that time.
5 A characterization of algebra is needed. ‘The determination of unknowns’ is a necessary but not a sufficient condition; for
under it most mathematics is algebra! I would also require the explicit representation of knowns and unknowns by special words
and/or symbols, and articulation of operations upon them (such as addition or concatenation), relationships between them (such
as inequalities and expansions), and their basic laws. On the specification of ancient “algebra” see Høyrup [2002, Chapter 7].
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these geometrical relationships, essential to the theorem, are lost in the single sign ‘+’ in (1).
Further, a and b are associated with numbers, and thereby with lengths and their multiplication. But
Euclid worked with lines, regions, solids, and angles, not any arithmeticized analogues such as lengths,
areas, volumes, or degrees; he never multiplied geometrical magnitudes of any kind (in important contrast
to his arithmetic in Books 7–9, where he multiplied integers in the usual way). Hence ‘a2’ is already a
historical distortion [Grattan-Guinness, 1996].6
For reasons such as this the algebraic reading of Euclid has been discredited by specialist historians
in recent decades. By contrast, it is still advocated by mathematicians, such as Weil [1980], who
even claimed that group theory is necessary to understand Book 5 (introducing ratios, and forming
propositions and other theorems involving geometrical magnitudes) and Book 7 (introducing basic
properties of positive integers)! An interesting practitioner of the reading of Euclid as a geometric algebra
was T.L. Heath, whose translation and edition of Euclid, first published in the 1900s, is still the major
source in English [Euclid, 1926]. I am assured by Greek specialists that his translation is generally
faithful to the original. To take an important example, he writes “square on the side,” not “square of
the side,” which can easily be confused with “side squared” and thus lead to the algebra of (1); even
Heath’s distinguished predecessor Robert Simson had used it in his influential edition [Euclid, 1756—
for example, p. 51 for Book 2, Proposition 4 and (1)].7 Yet in his commentaries Heath rewrote many of
Euclid’s propositions in common algebra without seeming to notice the variance from his own translation
that inevitably follows (see his summary of geometric algebra in Euclid [1926, Vol. 1, 372–374]): in a
few cases his algebraic proofs differ from Euclid’s originals (for example, Book 6, Proposition 28).
It is now much better understood that identity (1) belongs to the heritage from Euclid, especially among
some Arabs with their word-based algebra (the phrase “completing the square” is Arabic in origin), and
then in European mathematics, when symbols for quantities and operations were gradually introduced.8
The actual version used in (1) corresponds more or less to the early 17th century, with figures such as
Thomas Harriot and René Descartes; Euclid and the relevant Arabs are part of their history, they are part
of the heritage from Euclid and those Arabs, and our use of (1) forms part of our heritage from both of
them.9 Here we have various history and heritage statements, all in one sentence: fine, but do not muddle
them up!
This advice seems to have been offered by E.J. Dijksterhuis (1892–1965) in his inaugural lecture as
Professor of the History of Exact Sciences at Utrecht University in 1953. He used the adjectives “genetic”
or “evolutionary” to characterize heritage and “phenomenological” for history [Struik, 1980, 12–13: the
last adjective was perhaps not well chosen]. Not coincidentally, his edition of Euclid was much more
6 Again, Euclid defined lines as “breadthless” (Book 1, Definition 2); often criticized by inheritors, he made clear an aspect
of his own history, in replacing the Babylonian use of “lines” as objects with width [Høyrup, 1995; and 2002, passim].
7 Translations of mathematical texts often entail tricky questions of history and heritage, along with semantic and syntactic
issues. These latter are especially marked when the languages involved belong to different families; in particular, Hoe [1978]
translates Chinese into English or French character by character rather than by the word structure of the final language. See also
Section 4.6 on general words.
8 There is of course another large history and heritage from Euclid, inspired by the alleged rigour of this proofs. It links in
part to the modernization of his geometry, but I shall not discuss it here.
9 This last feature applies also, regrettably, to the supposed history [Rashed, 1994] of Arabic algebra, where the Arabs seem
already to have read Descartes.
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square on side a was denoted T (a), with T for “tetragon” [Euclid, 1929–1930].
In the rest of this paper I shall concentrate upon general historical and historiographical issues. In so
doing no claim is made that history is superior to heritage, or superordinate upon it. A companion essay to
this one dealing with good and bad practices in the prosecution of heritage is very desirable. History and
heritage are twins, each profiting from practices used in the other. I only claim, outside of the discussion
to follow, that it is often worthwhile to have some knowledge of the history of any context or subject in
which one is interested.
3. Some attendant distinctions
3.1. Pre- and posthistory
The distinction between history and the heritage of N clearly involves its relationship to its prehistory
and to its posthistory. The historian may well try to spot the historical foresight—or maybe lack of
foresight—of his historical figures, the ways in which they thought or hoped that the notions at hand
may be developed. He should be aware of the merit as well as the difficulties of “not being wise after the
event” [Agassi, 1963, 48–67]. By contrast, the inheritor may seek historical perspective and hindsight
about the ways the notions actually seemed to have developed. This distinction, quite subtle, is often
overlooked.
The distinction is emphatically not that between success and failure; history also records successes, but
with the slips and delays also exposed. A nice example is Hawkins [1970], a fine history of the application
of point set topology to refine the integral from the Cauchy–Riemann version through content in the sense
of Camille Jordan and Georg Cantor to the measure theory of Emile Borel and Henri Lebesgue. Hawkins
not only records the progress achieved but also carefully recounts conceptual slips made en route: for
example, the belief until its refutation that denumerable set, set of measure zero, and nowhere dense set
were coextensive concepts.
The general situation may be expressed as follows. Let N0, N1, and N2 form a sequence of (say) three
notions holding some contextual (not necessarily logical) relationship, and lying in forward chronological
order; then the heritage of N1 for N2 belongs also to the history of N2 relative to N0 and N1. In both
history and heritage it is worth finding out whether or not N0 played an active role in the creation of
N1, N2, . . . (as with the Euclid example for some Arabs), or if it is simply being used as a test case for
them. However, more is involved than the difference between pre- and posthistory; for both categories
use posthistory, though in quite different ways. In the elaboration below some further examples will be
used below, though for reasons of space they are treated rather briefly; fuller historical accounts would
take note of interactions with the development of other relevant notions.
3.2. History is usually a story of heritages
The historian records developments and events where normally an historical figure inherited
knowledge from the past in order to make his own contributions heritage style. Conversely, heritage
unavoidably involves various histories. Some attention to the broad features of history may well enrich
the inheritance, and perhaps even suggest a research topic.
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1900 as well as in 2000. Thus the historian in 2000 may have needed to note how it was (mis-)understood
by later figures, including historians as well as mathematicians, when it formed parts of their heritages.
If a mathematician really did treat a predecessor in an historical spirit, at least as he (mis-)understood
it, then the (now meta-)historian should record accordingly (see, for example, Stedall [2001] on John
Wallis’s partly and dubiously historical Algebra of 1685).
3.3. Types of influence
Types of influence raise important issues. Heritage is likely to focus only upon positive influence,
whereas history needs to take note also of negative influences, especially of a general kind, such as
reaction against some notion or the practice of it or importance accorded some context. For example, one
motive for A.L. Cauchy to found mathematical analysis in the 1820s upon a theory of limits (Section 4.1)
was his rejection of J.L. Lagrange’s approach to the calculus using only notions from algebra. Further, as
part of his new regime Cauchy stipulated that “a divergent series has no sum,” regarding as illegitimate the
results obtained by Leonhard Euler [Hofmann, 1959] and various other contemporaries and successors;
but in the 1890s Borel reacted against precisely this decree and became a major figure in the development
of summability and formal power series [Tucciarone, 1973]. Thus we have some heritage from Euler and
from Cauchy and some history of Borel at the same time.
3.4. The role of chronology
The role of chronology differs greatly. In history it can form a major issue; for example, possible
differences between the creations of a sequence of notions and those of their publication. Further, the
details available may only give a crude or inexact time course, so that some questions of chronology
remain unanswerable. It is particularly difficult or even impossible to determine for ancient mathematics
and for ethnomathematics. In heritage chronology is much less significant: however, mathematicians
often regard questions of the type “Who was the first mathematician to . . .?” as the prime type of historical
question to pose [May, 1975b], whereas historians recognize them as often close to meaninglessness
when the notion involved is very general or basic. For example, “. . . to use a function?” could excite
a large collection of candidates according to the state, generality or abstractness of the function
theory involved ([Thiele, 2000]; compare Section 4.6). The only questions of this kind of genuine
historical interest concerns priority disputes, when intense parallel developments among rivals are under
investigation, and chronology is tight—and where again maybe no answer can be found.
3.5. Use of notions later than N
This is a major matter. Later notions are not to be ignored; the idea of forgetting the later past of
an historical episode, often put forward as desirable historiography, is impossible to achieve, since the
historian has to know which notions are later, and this requires the historical task already to have been
accomplished (Section 5.1). Instead, when studying the history of N0, by all means recognize the place of
later notions N1, N2, . . . , but avoid feeding them back into N0 itself. For if that does happen, the novelties
that attended the emergence of N1, N2, . . . , will not be registered. Instead time loops are created, with
cause and effect over time becoming reversed: when N2 and N1 are shoved into N0, then they seem to be
170 I. Grattan-Guinness / Historia Mathematica 31 (2004) 163–185involved in its creation, whereas the converse is (or may be) the case. In such situations not only is the
history of N0 messed up but also that of the intruding successors, since their absence before introduction
is not registered.
For example, in the late 18th century Lagrange realized that the solvability of polynomial equations
by algebraic operations alone was connected to properties of certain functions of their roots when the
latter were permuted; and this achievement played a role in the development of group theory during the
19th century [Wussing, 1984, 70–84]. Now to describe his work in terms of group theory not only distorts
Lagrange but also muddies the (later) emergence of that theory itself by failing to note its absence in him.
Sometimes such modernizations are useful to save space on notations, say, or to summarize mathematical
relationships, but the ahistorical character should be stressed: “in terms of group theory (which Lagrange
did not have), his theorem on roots may be stated thus: . . . .”
A valuable use of later notions when studying the history of N0 is as sources for questions to ask about
N0 itself—but do not expect positive answers! However, negative answers need to be examined carefully;
lack of evidence does not provide evidence of lack.
By contrast, when studying the heritage of N0, by all means feed back N1, N2, . . . , to create new
versions; it may be clarified by such procedures. The chaos in the resulting history is not significant;
maybe even a topic for mathematical research will emerge. But it is only negative feedback, unhelpful
for both history and heritage, to attack a historical figure for having found only naïve or limited versions
of a theory that, as his innovations, helped to lead to the later versions upon which the attack is based. To
resume the case of summability from Section 3.3, it is not informative to regard Euler on that topic as an
idiot; but also he did not foresee the rich panoply of uses to which “divergent series” are now put.
3.6. A schematic representation of the distinction
The difference is shown in Fig. 1, where time runs from left to right. For history the horizontal arrows
do not impinge positively upon the preceding notions whereas those for heritage do. That is, in history one
should avoid feeding later notions back into N if they did not play roles there; by contrast, such practices
are fine for the purposes of heritage and indeed constitute a common and fruitful way of conducting
research (Section 3.1).
Each N may be a collection of notions, with some or maybe all some playing roles in the creation of
successors in the next collection. Arrows pointing forwards in time could be drawn, to represent foresight,
hopes for further progress.
Fig. 1.
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The distinction can be extended when N is an axiomatized theory, which proceeds logically through
concepts C1, C2, C3, . . . ; for to some extent the respective historical origins move backward in time, thus
broadly the reverse of the historical record. A related difference is thereby exposed: heritage suggests that
the foundations of a mathematical theory are laid down as the platform upon which it is built, whereas
history shows that foundations are dug down, and not necessarily onto firm territory. For example, the
foundations of arithmetic may start with mathematical logic in a version of the 1900s (hopefully free from
paradoxes!), use set theory as established mainly by Cantor in the 1880s and 1890s, define progressions
via the Peano axioms of the later 1880s, and then lay out the main properties of integers as established
long before that.
A figure important in that story is Richard Dedekind, with his book of 1888 on the foundations of
arithmetic. The danger of making historical nonsense out of heritage is well shown in a supposed new
translation. A typical example of the text is the following passage, where Dedekind’s statement that (in
literal translation) “All simply infinite systems are similar to the number-series N and consequently by
(33) also to one another” comes out as “All unary spaces are bijective 1 to the unary space 2N and
consequently, by §33, 3 also to one another”; moreover, of the three editorial notes, the first one admits
that “isomorphic” would be more appropriate for Dedekind but the second one informs that “unary space
[. . .] is what he means” . . . [Dedekind, 1995, 63].
3.8. Indeterminism or determinism?
Especially if history properly records missed opportunities and delayed and late arrivals of conception
and/or publication, it will carry an indeterministic character: the history did indeed pass through the
sequence of notions N0, N1, N2, . . . , but it might have been otherwise. Everything in this paper is
proposed in an explicitly indeterministic spirit. The inheritor can take a hint from the historian here:
in the past, many theories have developed slowly and/or fitfully, with long periods of sleep; so which
theories are sleeping today?
By contrast, even if not explicitly stressed, a deterministic impression is likely to be conveyed by
heritage: N0 had to lead to N1. Appraisal of historical figures as “progressive” or “modern,” in any
context, is normally of this kind: the appropriate features of their work are stressed, the others ignored.
In this respect, and in some others such as the stress on hindsight and the flavor of determinism, heritage
resembles Whig history, the seemingly inevitable success of the actual victors, with predecessors assessed
primarily in terms of similarities with the dominant position. For scientists Isaac Newton as a modern
scientist gains a “yes,” but Isaac Newton the major alchemist is a “no.”10 Again, the inheritor may read
something by, say, Lagrange and exclaims: “My word, Lagrange here is very modern!”; but the historian
should reply: “No, we are very Lagrangian.”
A fine example of indeterminism is provided by the death of Bernhard Riemann in 1866. The world
lost a very great mathematician, and early; had he lived longer, new theories might have come from
him that arrived only later or maybe not at all. On the other hand, his friend Dedekind published in
10 [Arnol’d, 1990] is a supposedly historical assessment of Isaac Newton’s remarkable theorem in the Principia on the class
of closed convex curves expressible by algebraic formulae; apparently it was a theorem about the topology of Abelian integrals
(Chapter 5, including a fantasy on p. 85 about Cauchy’s motivation to complex-variable analysis).
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seemingly indefinitely. While both manuscripts contained notions already present in the work of some
other mathematicians, they made rapid and considerable impacts on their appearance. Had the one on
mathematical analysis and especially trigonometric series not appeared then, there is no reason to assume
that Cantor, a young number theorist in the early 1870s, would have tackled the problem of exceptional
sets for Fourier series (to use the later name) which Riemann exposed, and thereby invented the first
elements of his set theory [Dauben, 1979, Chapters 1–2]; but then many parts of mathematical analysis
would have developed differently. The other manuscript, on the foundations of geometry, is noted at the
end of the next section.
3.9. Revolutions or convolutions?
In appraising heritage, interest lies mainly in notions in (fairly) finished form without special concern
about the dynamics of their production. A deterministically construed heritage can convey the impression
that the apparently inevitable progress shows mathematics to be a cumulative discipline.
But history suggests otherwise; some theories die away, or at least their status reduced. The status or
even occurrence of revolutions in mathematics is historically quite controversial [Gillies, 1992]; I have
proposed the meta-notion of convolution, where new and old notions wind around each other as a (partly)
new theory is created [Grattan-Guinness, 1992]. Convolution lies between, and can mix, three standard
categories: revolution, in the sense of strict replacement of theory; innovation, where replacement is
absent or plays a minor role (I do not know of a case where even a remarkably novel notion came
from literally no predecessors); and evolution, similar to convolution in itself but carrying many specific
connotations in the life sciences that are not necessarily relevant here.
One of the most common ways in which old and new mix is when a new notion is created by
connecting two or more old notions in a novel way. Among very many cases, in 1593 François Viète
connected Archimedes’s algorithmic exhaustion of the circle using the square, regular octagon, . . . with











. . . .
Again, in the 1820s Niels Henrik Abel and Carl Jacobi independently linked the notion of the inverse
of a mathematical function with Adrian-Marie Legendre’s theory of “elliptic functions” (to us, elliptic
integrals) to produce their definitive theories of elliptic functions. Heritage may also lead to new
connections being effected.
Sometimes convolutions, revolutions, and traditions can be evident together. A very nice case is found
in the work of Joseph Fourier in the 1800s on heat diffusion [Grattan-Guinness and Ravetz, 1972]:
(1) Apart from an unclear and limited anticipation by J.-B. Biot, he innovated the differential equation
to represent the phenomenon.
(2) The method that he used to obtain it was traditional, namely Euler’s version of the Leibnizian
differential and integral calculus (which is noted in Section 4.1).
(3) He refined the use of boundary conditions to adjoin to the internal diffusion equation for solid bodies.
(4) He revolutionized understanding of the solution of the diffusion equation for finite bodies by
using infinite trigonometric series; the solution had been known before him but was importantly
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function at all.
(5) He innovated the Fourier integral solution for infinite bodies.
Delays often arise from connections not being made. A well-known puzzle is the slowness to recognize
non-Euclidean geometries when there was a long history of mapmaking which surely exhibits one kind
of such a geometry. J.H. Lambert is an especially striking figure, as he worked with some luster in both
areas in the later 18th century. The answer seems to be that, like his predecessors and several successors,
he understood the geometry problem as being just the status, especially provability, of the parallel axiom
within the Euclidean framework rather than the more general issue of alternative geometries, which was
fully grasped only by Riemann in his 1854/1867 manuscript [Gray, 1989]. Thus the link, which seems so
clear in our heritage, was not obvious in the earlier times.
3.10. Description or explanation?
Both history and heritage are concerned with description; but, as was mentioned in Section 1.1,
history should also attempt explanations of the developments found, and also of the delays and missed
opportunities that are noticed. These explanations can be of various kinds; not just of the technical
insights that were gained but also of the social background, such as the (lack of) educational opportunities
for mathematics in the community or country involved. Especially in ancient and medieval times, and
not only in the West, prevalent philosophical and/or religious stances could play important roles. One
feature especially of the 19th century which needs explanation is the differences between nations in
the (un)popularity of topics or branches of mathematics (France doing loads of mathematical analysis,
England and Ireland rather little of it but working hard at several new algebras, and so on).
Heritage studies need to consider explanation only from a formal or epistemological point of view.
For example, it would explain the mystery of having to use complex numbers when finding the real roots
of polynomials with real coefficients in terms of closure of operations over sets, an insight which has its
own history [Sinaceur, 1991, pt. 2].
3.11. Levels of (un)importance
This last task relates to another difference; that a notion rises and/or falls in importance. Heritage does
not need to give such changes much attention; the modern level of importance is taken for granted. But
history should watch and ponder upon the changes carefully. A general class of cases is considered in
Section 4.4.
A fine example is provided by trigonometry. For a long time it has been an obviously useful but rather
minor topic in a course in algebra—and, correspondingly, there has been no detailed general history of
it since von Braunmühl [1900, 1903]. By contrast, in the late Middle Ages it was a major branch of
mathematics; and handled geometrically, so that, for example, the sine was a length measured against
the hypotenuse as unit, not as a ratio of lengths. In further contrast, spherical trigonometry was more
important than planar trigonometry because of its use in astronomy and navigation.
As a converse example, probability theory and especially mathematical statistics had long and slow
geneses; most of the principal notions in statistics are less than then two centuries old, and the cluster of
them which is associated with Karl Pearson and his school has celebrated its centenary only recently. The
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functioning separate from it, is one of the great mysteries of the history of mathematics; its modest place
during most of the 19th century is especially astonishing. But this tardiness need not disturb a seeker of
heritage within it.
3.12. Handling muddles
One way in which knowledge of all kinds increases, especially the mathematical, is by the cleaning up
of unclarities and ambiguities by bringing in new distinctions of sense; for example, the convergence of
series of functions was split, largely by Karl Weierstrass and his followers from the 1870s onwards, into
various modes of uniform, nonuniform, and quasi-uniform convergence [Hardy, 1918]. Such housework
forms part of the heritage that the mathematician will deploy (unless he has reason to question it
historically). The historian will also note the modern presence of such distinctions, but he should try
to reconstruct the old unclarities, as clearly as possible, so that the history of the distinctions is itself
studied. Section 4.1 includes an important example.
This historical procedure seems to contradict the claim of Section 3.5 that history usually stresses
differences between notions while heritage highlights similarities; for preserving muddles keeps things
the same while cleaning them up brings out differences. However, there is no difficulty; to continue with
the example of the various modes of convergence before the Weierstrassians, the historian will stress
the difference between the ignorance of them among predecessors and our knowledge of them while the
inheritor will insert them into that earlier work and so make it more similar to the later version.
3.13. On some consequences for mathematics education
The issue of heuristics in mathematics, and the discovery and later justification of mathematical
notions, is strongly present in this discussion, with obvious bearing upon mathematics education. The
tradition there, especially at university level or equivalent, is to teach a mathematical theory in a manner
very much guided by heritage. But reactions of students—including myself, as I still vividly recall—are
often distaste and bewilderment; not particularly that mathematics is very hard to understand and even
to learn but mainly that it turns up in “perfect” dried-out forms, so that if there are any mistakes, then
necessarily the student made them. Mathematical theories come over as all answers but no questions, all
solutions but no problems—and only the cleverest students possess enough intelligence to understand it.
A significant part of the growth in interest in the history of mathematics has been inspired by the
negative influence (Section 3.3) of such situations, and there is now a strong international movement for
making use of history in the teaching of mathematics, at all levels [Fauvel and van Mannen, 2000]. In a
companion paper [Grattan-Guinness, 2004] I consider the bearing of the distinction between history and
heritage upon mathematics education in some detail; the main points are rehearsed here, and another one
in Section 5.4.
Long ago I proposed the metatheoretical notion of “history–satire,” where the broad historical record
is respected but many of the complications often contained in the messy details are omitted or elided
[Grattan-Guinness, 1973]: if one stays solely within, say, Newton’s historical context all the time, then
one will stop where Newton stopped. Otto Toeplitz’s “genetic approach” to the calculus [Toeplitz, 1963]
is close to a special case of this approach [Schubring, 1978]. (Note from Section 1.2 the use of “genetic”
I. Grattan-Guinness / Historia Mathematica 31 (2004) 163–185 175by Dijksterhuis to characterize heritage.) It is also very well deployed in Bressoud [1994], a textbook on
real-variable mathematical analysis.
Where does mathematical education lie in between history and heritage? My answer is: exactly there,
and a very nice place it is. Educators can profitably use both history and heritage for their purposes.
For example, the algebraic version of Euclid, so important in its heritage, is often and well used in this
kind of teaching. But also available is the real Euclid of arithmetic and geometry, including the beautiful
theory of ratios, for me the mathematical jewel of the work, both fine mathematics in its own right and
an excellent route in to the notoriously difficult task of teaching (the different topic of) rational numbers.
(To make another contrast between history and heritage, Euclid used only the reciprocals 1/m among
the rational numbers, and no irrational numbers at all.) Following history–satire, the differences between
the two Euclids should be stressed; indeed, they could start off lots of nice points about the relationships
between these three branches of mathematics in elementary contexts, such as the difference between
lines (geometry without arithmetic) and lengths (geometry with arithmetic). A recent attractive study of
the history of algebra, including the role of Euclid, is provided by Bashmakova and Smirnova [2000],
though in my view the authors conflate history and heritage statements throughout [Grattan-Guinness,
2004, Section 8].
4. Prevailing habits: six cases
Anything that has become background, or context, or tradition is no longer salient, sometimes no longer represented symbolically at
all. —James Franklin, The Science of Conjecture: Evidence and Probability before Pascal (p. 344) [2001]
I consider six special cases of aspects of mathematics where the conflation of history and heritage
seems to be especially acute, including among historians. The cause seems to be habitual use of the
notions involved, so commonplace as not to be questioned. The examples come mostly from the 19th
and early 20th centuries, which not accidentally is my own main period of research; thus no claim of
optimal importance or variety is made for them. Examples of the distinctions made in Section 3 are also
included.
4.1. The calculus and the theory of limits
There have been four main ways of developing the calculus [Grattan-Guinness, 1987]: in chronological
order:
(1) Newton’s “fluxions” and “fluents” (1660s onwards), for theory of limits deployed, though not
convincingly;
(2) G.W. Leibniz’s “differential” and “integral” calculus, based upon dx and ∫ x (1670s onwards), with
infinitesimals central to and limits absent from all the basic concepts: reformulated by Euler in the
mid-1750s by adding in the “differential coefficient,” the forerunner of the derivative;
(3) Lagrange’s algebraization of the theory, in an attempt to avoid both limits and infinitesimals, with a
new basis sought in Taylor’s power-series expansion (1770s onwards), and the successive differential
coefficients reconceived in terms of the coefficients of the series as the “derived functions”; and
(4) Cauchy’s approach based upon a firm theory (and not just intuition) of limits (1810s onwards); from
it he defined the basic notions of the calculus (including the derivative as the limiting value of the
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Gradually the last tradition gained wide acceptance, with major refinements brought in with Karl
Weierstrass and followers from the mid-century onwards. In particular, they honed Cauchy’s basically
single-limit theory into one of multiple limits with a plethora of new distinctions (including the modes
of convergence noted in Section 3.12). Thus it has long been the standard way of teaching the calculus;
but historians should beware using it to rewrite the history of the calculus where any of the other three
traditions, especially Newton and Cauchy’s, are being studied. It also contains an internal danger. The
(post-)Weierstrassian refinements have become standard fare, and are incorporated into the heritage of
Cauchy; but it is mere feedback-style ahistory to read Cauchy (and contemporaries such as Bernard
Bolzano) as if they had read Weierstrass already [Freudenthal, 1971]. On the contrary, their own pre-
Weierstrassian muddles need historical reconstruction, and clearly (Section 3.12). Again by contrast,
inheritors can acknowledge such anachronisms but ignore them, and just see whether or not the
mathematics produced is interesting.
4.2. Part-whole theory and set theory
An important part of Cauchy’s tradition by (some of) the Weierstrassians was the introduction from the
early 1870s of set theory, principally by Cantor (Section 3.8). Gradually it too gained a prominent place
in mathematics and then in mathematics education; so again conflations lurk around its history. They can
occur not only in putting set-theoretical notions into the prehistory, but also, in particular, in confusing
that theory with the traditional way of handling collections from antiquity: namely, the theory of whole
and parts, where a class of objects contains only parts (such as the class of Australian cathedrals as a part
of the class of cathedrals), and membership was not distinguished from inclusion. Relative to set theory
parthood corresponds to improper inclusion, but the theory can differ philosophically from Cantor’s
doctrine, on matters such as the status of the empty class/set, and the class/set as one and as many;
so care is needed. An interesting example occurs in avoiding the algebraization of Euclid mentioned
in Section 2: Mueller [1981] proposed an algebra alternative to that in (1) in Section 2 above, but he
deployed set theory in it, whereas Euclid had followed the traditional theory, so that a different distortion
arises. As in earlier points, inheritors need feel no discomfort.
4.3. Vectors and matrices
In a somewhat disjointed way vector and matrix algebras and vector analysis gradually developed
during the 19th century, and slowly became staple techniques during the 20th century, including in
mathematics education [Grattan-Guinness, 1994, articles 6.2, 6.7, 6.8, 7.12]. But then the danger just
highlighted arises again; for earlier work was not thought out that way. The issue is not just one of
notation; the key lies in the associated notions, especially the concept of laying out a vector as a row or
column of quantities and a matrix as a square or rectangular array, and manipulating them separately or
together according to stipulated rules and definitions. Similar remarks can be applied to tensor analysis.
A particularly influential example of these anachronisms is Truesdell; in very important pioneering
historical work of the 1950s he expounded achievements by especially Euler in continuum mathematics
that previously had been largely ignored (see, for example, Truesdell [1954]). However, in the spirit of
I. Grattan-Guinness / Historia Mathematica 31 (2004) 163–185 177heritage in his remark quoted at the head of this paper, he treated Euler as already familiar with vector
analysis and some matrix theory, and also using derivatives as defined via the theory of limits, whereas
in fact Euler had actually used his own elaboration of Leibniz’s version of the calculus mentioned in
Section 4.1. Therefore Truesdell’s Euler was out of chronological location by at least a century. It is quite
amusing to read Truesdell’s editorial commentaries and then Euler’s original texts in the same volumes
(11 and 12 of the second series) of the Opera omnia. Much historical reworking of Euler’s mechanics
is needed, not only to clarify what and how he had actually done and not done but also to eliminate the
mess-ups of feedback. The history of vectors and matrices needs to be clarified by noting the absence of
these notions in Euler.
4.4. The status of applied mathematics
This case exemplifies the variation of levels of importance raised in Section 3.11, in a case where
certain features of heritage have affected levels of historical interest. During the middle of the 19th
century the professionalization of mathematics increased quite notably in Europe; many more universities
and other institutions of higher education were created or expanded, so that the number of jobs increased.
During that period, a rather snobbish preference for pure over applied or even applicable mathematics
began to develop in the German states and then Germany, and later internationally. Again this change has
affected mathematics education, for the worse.11
The tendency has also influenced historical work in that the history of pur(ish) topics has been
studied far more than that of applications; the history of military mathematics is especially ignored.
But a mismatch of levels of importance arises; for prior to the change applications and applicability
were very much the governing motivation for mathematics, and the balance of historical research should
better reflect it. Euler is a very good case; studies of his contributions to purish mathematics far exceed
those of his applied mathematics (hence the importance of Truesdell’s initiative in looking in detail at
his mechanics). Some negative influence from current practice is required of historians to correct this
imbalance.
4.5. The place of axiomatization
From the late 19th century onwards David Hilbert encouraged the axiomatization of mathematical
theories, in order to make clearer the assumptions made and also to study metaproperties of consistency,
completeness, and independence. His advocacy, supported by various followers, has given axiomatization
a high status in mathematics, and thence in mathematics education. But once again dangers of distortion
of earlier work attend, for Hilbert’s initiative was then part of a new level of concern with axiomatization
[Cavaillès, 1938]; earlier work was rarely so preoccupied, although the desire to make clear basic
assumptions was frequently evident (for example, in the calculus, as reviewed in Section 4.1). Apart
from Euclid, of the other figures named above only Dedekind can be regarded as an axiomatizer; it is out
of line so to characterize the others, even Lagrange, Cauchy, Weierstrass, or Cantor.
11 Both history and heritage attach to the words “pure” and “applied” mathematics, and to cousins such as “mixed.” The
history of these adjectives is itself worth study.
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One aim of many mathematical theories is generality; and attendant to this aspiration is the use of
correspondingly wide-ranging words or phrases, such as “arbitrary” or “in any manner,” to characterize
pertinent notions. The expressions may well still be used in many modern contexts; so again the danger
of identification with their past manifestations needs to be watched.
A good example is the phrase “any function” in the calculus and the related theory of functions; it
or some cognate (such as “functio quomodocumque”) will be found with (at least) John Bernoulli in the
early 18th century, Euler about 40 years later, Lagrange and S.-F. Lacroix around 1800, J.P.G. Dirichlet in
the late 1820s, and Lebesgue and the French school of analysts in the early 20th century. Nowadays it is
usually taken to refer to a mapping (maybe with special conditions such as isomorphism), with set theory
used to specify range and domain and no other details or conditions. But the universe of functions has
not always been so vast; generality has always belonged to its period of assertion. In particular, Dirichlet
[1829] mentioned the characteristic function of the irrational numbers (to use the modern name); but he
quite clearly regarded it as a pathological case, for it did not possess an integral. The difference is great
between his situation and that of Lebesgue’s time, for the integrability of such a function was a good test
case of the new theory of measure to which he was a major contributor; indeed, this detail is part of the
heritage from Dirichlet.
5. History and heritage as metatheories
So far the concerns and examples treated in this paper have centered on mathematics alone; but clearly
the issue of history and heritage is more general. One can see the same kinds of issue arising in the
histories of the other sciences and of technology [Pickstone, 1995] and indeed outside the sciences
altogether; for example, some nice examples arise in music, in connection with preferred practices in
the execution of “authentic performance” of older works. Thus, while mathematics seems to provide by
far the richest context and examples (at least to my knowledge), the issues themselves have a broader
remit. In this section I state the four principles that inform the discussion above.
5.1. History is unavoidable
We work out in the present from the past, whether we like it or not. Thus ignorance of history does
not produce immunity from it any more than ignorance of food poisoning saves one from attacks of it.
On the contrary, influence is all the more likely to be exerted.
This principle brings into question a basic issue in mathematics (and other sciences) and its teaching:
namely, should one bother with the history or ignore it completely? Recognition of its unavoidability
shows that the question itself is falsely posed: the issue is not history yes or no, but history how? A dried-
out formulation of a theory of the kind mentioned at the end of Section 1.1, denuded of human names,
background, or heuristic, is still not immune from history; for example, it continues a historical tradition
of presenting mathematical theories in a dried-out formulation, denuded of human names, background,
and heuristic. For the same reasons, heritage also is unavoidable. So it is better to be aware of both of
them, and the relationships that they excite and unavoidably impose.
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If history is unavoidable, then it has to be addressed somehow. We have some historical text before
us; say Euclid’s Elements. How can we read it in a historical spirit? A popular answer, put forward for
all kinds of history, goes as follows. When reading Euclid’s work, forget all theories in the field involved
that have been developed since; step into his shoes (more likely sandals, in this case) and read his work
with his eyes.
Unfortunately, as was noted briefly in Section 3.5, this method suffers from a difficulty; namely, it is
completely useless. For in order to ignore all knowledge produced since Euclid one needs to know what
that knowledge is in the first place. But in order to know that we must be able distinguish it from the
knowledge produced before and during Euclid’s time. But in order to know that we need to know the
history of Euclid’s work—before studying the history of Euclid’s work! Q.E.D.12
To avoid this contradiction it is necessary to realize that when the historian studies his historical figures
he has to realize that he is thinking about them, not with them. It is claimed that the distinction between
theory and metatheory is of central importance for knowledge, whether mathematical or of any other
kind. The position of the horizontal arrows above the notions in the history part of Fig. 1 forms an image
of this situation, in contrast to the feedback imaged in the heritage part of Fig. 1.
The importance of this distinction lies in its generality.13 This emerged from the 1930s onwards,
inspired principally by the logicians Kurt Gödel and Alfred Tarski after several partial anticipations, of
which David Hilbert’s program of metamathematics as practiced during the 1930 was the most notable
[Grattan-Guinness, 2000, Chapters 8–9]. In most other disciplines the distinction is too obvious to require
special emphasis; clearly a difference of category exists between, say, properties of light and laws of
optics, or between a move in chess and a rule of chess. By contrast, in logic, a very general branch of
knowledge, the distinction is uniquely subtle (and therefore desirable); for example, “and” features in
both logic and metalogic, and failure to register the distinction led to much incoherence and even to
paradoxes such as one arising from “this proposition is false.” Its importance and generality can be seen
in Tarski’s theory of truth (his own main way to this distinction): “snow is white” (in the “metalanguage,”
Tarski’s word) if and only if snow is white (in the language). His theory is neutral with respect to most
philosophies and sidesteps generations of philosophical anxiety about making true (or false) judgements
or holding such beliefs.
Consider now a mathematical theory M. Its history is one kind of metatheory of it, its heritage is
another, Hilbert-style metamathematics is a third if M is suitably axiomatized, questions about how to
teach it are a fourth, and there may well be others.
As with theory itself, metatheory requires its own metametatheory, and so on up as far as may be
needed; thus theory becomes stratified. An example of metametatheory is the history of the history of
mathematics, upon which a comprehensive book has recently been published [Dauben and Scriba, 2002];
12 In a posthumously published consideration of “History as re-enactment of past experience,” which has been much discussed
by philosophers of history, Collingwood [1946, 282–289] took Book 1, Proposition 5 of Euclid’s Elements, that “In isosceles
triangles the angles at the base are equal to one another,” and contrasted Euclid’s own thoughts about the theorem from
the thoughts about it made by a later historian. However, he tended to stress the similarities of the thoughts rather than the
differences, and did not explicate metatheory in the way advocated in this paper.
13 Generality is not a necessary virtue. I agree with the maxim attributed to Saunders Mac Lane: “We do not need the greatest
generality, but the right generality.”
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example of Wallis (Section 3.2), also belong to the history of history. Another example, indeed a self-
referring one (Section 6), is this paper; it belongs to the history of history (of mathematics), although
whether it also will enjoy a heritage is another matter! If such a miracle were to occur, then the paper
would belong to another third-order theory: the history of philosophy of history, an interesting subject
for which a good sourcebook has recently been published [Burns and Rayment-Pickard, 2000].
One great advantage of adopting stratification is that the assumptions chosen to underlie the
theory do not have to be adopted also for its metatheory. An interesting and explicit case lies in
L.E.J. Brouwer. Especially from the 1920s, he put forward a constructivist approach to mathematics,
called “intuitionism,” in which he rejected the law of excluded middle [van Dalen, 1999]. However, his
metamathematics, which he called “mathematics of the second order,” was classical, with that law in
place; a proof was intuitionistically correct or not. No contradiction arises, since the levels are different.
The same freedom attends the historian when he sees himself as metatheorist. For he does not have to
defend or even like what he tries to describe or to explain. Why should he? After all, he was not there.
This point aligns with commonplace understandings; that a historian of, say, Hinduism does not have to
be a Hindu, although he might be. Similarly, the inheritor has to take what he can find, maybe without
enthusiasm. Stratification also sidesteps the fashionable modern chatter about narratives and discourses
[Windschuttle, 1997] and the relativism and just waffle that often accompanies it.
5.3. Knowledge is based upon ignorance
This is true in the important sense that theories explain knowns in terms of unknowns. To take Euclid
again, the primitives in his geometry include the “common notions” and axioms given in Book 1 (and
indeed more axioms than he realized, as has been understood for over a century); but these primitives
cannot be known in terms of other notions, for then they would no longer be primitive. To take another
case, one of the bases of parts of Newton’s mechanics is his inverse-square law of central attraction,
which is unknown, maybe unknowable, and certainly mysterious!
This principle is worth stressing partly because it is often confused with an important but quite different
way in which theories develop; namely, having being created in one context, they are then applied to new
ones to see how they fare. To continue with the Newton case, Euler and others applied his theory to areas
of continuum mechanics such as elasticity theory and fluid mechanics, where Newton had not said a
great deal. Euler also took the second law of motion to apply in any direction whereas Newton himself
had restricted it to special directions such as tangents and normals to given curves [Truesdell, 1968,
Chapters 3 and 5]. Such developments tempt one to say that Newton’s theory explained the unknown in
terms of the known; but such claims are methodological, concerning the important process of changing
from contexts already known to contexts currently unknown. But the principle put forward in this section
is epistemological, concerning the structure of theories as such.
5.4. Knowledge and ignorance go together
This is true at the metatheoretic level in a profound way. For we have knowledge (of a fact, or theorem,
or whatever); and maybe also knowledge of that knowledge, such as a proof of a theorem. But we also
have knowledge of ignorance, especially when forming a problem or conjecture: when asking whether
or not some property does or does not obtain in a theory, the poser knows that he does not know the
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on a topic did not know that they did not know the substance of the problem because the properties
and connections were not known at the time in question. The emphasis upon ignorance, especially the
granting to it of a status metatheoretically equal to that of knowledge, is the principal novelty of the
approach advocated here.
Posing of problems enjoys high prestige in mathematics. To recall a historically famous case, Hilbert
[1901] posed in 1900 a string of them (some in rather sketched form) for mathematicians to tackle. In
each case he knew that answers were not yet known. One of them was Cantor’s continuum hypothesis
about the number of real numbers, which claimed that two particular infinite numbers were equal to each
other. Speculations on the infinite go back earlier than Cantor, but his predecessors did not know that
they did not know whether or not his continuum hypothesis was true or false because none of them knew
of two different ways of constructing infinite numbers in the first place.
The same kind of relationship obtains also in history (of mathematics as just one special case). The
historian knows various facts, say, and can even prove some, for example, by finding authoritative
documents. But he too can pose problems, concerning matters that he knew that he does not know;
and he can be unaware of other problems until new connections come to light. Layers of history as
exemplified in Section 3.2 concerning the history of history can also involve knowledge and ignorance;
what historians did (not) know at intermediate periods.
This scheme works also for (mathematics) education. One important task there is laying out a syllabus,
and the planning could focus much on deciding how long the students will be kept unaware of some
topic or theorem, when an associated problem should be posed, and when solutions be given to it. To use
common algebra again, a school course hoping to advance as far as the formula for the root of a cubic
equation will surely spare the youngsters knowledge of the horrible cube roots to come, but the problem
could be posed when the roots of the quadratic equation have been dealt with; and when the formula has
been obtained, further new questions posed, such as formulae for all three roots, and the possibility of
going further with formulae for the roots of the quartic, the quintic (big shock to come!), the sextic, . . . .
At every main stage in the teaching the interplay of knowledge and ignorance could play a major role in
the teaching, though preferably not muddled together (Section 3.13).
6. Philosophical prospects
As logicians have long known, generality skirts self-reference, which sometimes generates paradoxes.
Here is a hopefully virtuous example. The discussion in the last section was a sketch of a theory
of relationships between knowledge and ignorance. I know that it constitutes a problem (and, I
believe, an important one); but I am ignorant of a general solution of it, which would be a detailed
account of the main relationships and their own metarelations. Elaboration could be well guided by
consideration of the many ways in which changes take place in notions, especially in theorems and
theories. These include extending known notions, generalizing them, and/or abstracting them; making
new classifications of the mathematical objects involved; reacting to counterexamples by seeking the
defective components of the refuted theory; exposing hitherto unnoticed assumptions; in cases where
foundations are significant, interchanging some theorems, axioms, and/or definitions; devising new
algorithms, or modifying old ones; making new applications or extending known ones, both within
mathematics and to other disciplines; and forging new connections between branches of mathematics,
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arithmeticize his magnitudes).
A general theory of history and heritage would not be restricted to mathematics, which, however, is a
particular rich source of examples and issues. What are the prospects for further philosophical progress?
There are other intellectual contexts in which ignorance plays an active role. In mathematics it can
come into economics, where the actors in an economic situation are ignorant of the intentions of the other
actors. In probability theory, values are sometimes interpreted in terms of degrees of ignorance. Some
nonclassical logics are relevant, such as the logic of asking questions [Wisniewski, 1995]. Ignorance has
been aired occasionally in science; in particular, much interest was aroused by two “encyclopedias” on
it for science and for medicine, collections of articles in which specialists posed then unsolved problems
for their fields [Duncan and Weston-Smith, 1977, 1984].
All these cases are perfectly respectable, though inevitably oriented to specific contexts. To find the
generality that informs ours, we must move to philosophy proper, especially theories of knowledge.
However, there a kind of converse scenario emerges: the generality is indeed present, but ignorance
is treated like a disease, to be cured by the acquisition of knowledge, however, the philosophy at hand
claims that this is to be done. The same attitude seems to inform those philosophies of history that address
ignorance at all.14
The tradition in which this approach has been developed most systematically is scepticism, in which
Descartes was a major figure. It is a highly dystopian philosophy, a disenchantment inspired by the fact
that one does not know things for certain.15 Well, that is true, and for certain (note the use of metatheory
here); but scepticism can degenerate into unwelcomely negative positions, such as pure relativism or
nihilism (nobody can know anything, at least not better than anyone else).
The insight lacking is the positive one that it is nice to be ignorant, for that is where the problems
come from. The only philosophy of which I am aware which both exhibits this insight and also carries the
required generality is to be found in some writings of a philosopher who was deeply influenced by Tarski
from an early stage in his career: Karl Popper. I have in mind his concern with “the sources of knowledge
and of ignorance” [Popper, 1963, Intro.] and with the tricky self-referential problem of rationally
criticizing rationality itself [Watkins, 1969]. Also relevant are his detailed metaphilosophical arguments
for indeterminism and against determinism [Popper, 1982], which he also applied to historiography
itself.16
But even from Popper the hints are limited. Like most philosophers he said little about the formation
of scientific (including mathematical) theories; he was mainly concerned instead with the ways in which
14 A wide-ranging survey of other philosophical approaches to history in general is provided by Stanford [1997]. There is
no explicit discussion of the historiography of mathematics, though some space is given to that for science: his references to
mathematics concern either its place in the history of science or its use in mathematical history.
15 See Unger [1975] for a nice elaboration of sceptical positions, some linked to (lack of) facts and others related to (possibly
false) beliefs. However, Chapter 7 on “the impossibility of truth” is a very disappointing monistic treatment based for some
reason on relating proposed truth to “the whole truth about the world,” a notion that is indeed impossible to handle (but then
why invoke it?), so that truth as a notion is rejected. No use is made of stratification, not even in the (brief) treatment of Tarski’s
theory.
16 See Popper [1945, Chapter 25; 1957]. Note carefully his rather nonstandard use of the word “historicism.” On the
historiography of science, in a somewhat Popperian spirit, see also Agassi [1963]. Stanford [1997] considers other aspects of
Popper’s philosophy than those mooted in this paper, and seriously misdescribes him as a philosopher “of positivist inclinations”
(p. 39). The excellent index does not have entries for “ignorance,” “(in)determinism,” or “self-reference.”
I. Grattan-Guinness / Historia Mathematica 31 (2004) 163–185 183they could be tested. Further, despite his strong emphasis on theories, he was dismissive of questions of
ontology, that is, doctrines concerning existence and in being both the physical world and in commitments
of these kinds made in theories [Grattan-Guinness, 1986].17 He also did not write much on the philosophy
of mathematics and was disinclined to enter into discussion of it (personal experience, on several
occasions); ironic, then, that mathematics is such a rich source! However, maybe his insights can be
elaborated; if so, the outcome would corroborate one of his maxims: “all life is problem-solving.”
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